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ABSTRACT
The purpose with this work is to evaluate if there is an argument in favor of 
“central banking” that cannot be put aside on either economic or moral 
ground. In order to do such an inquiry, it will be discussed philosophically 
whether the institutions of private property and freedom of contract in general 
and good money in particular are of a higher value than national defense, 
since that is the last standing justification for the monetary prerogatives of 
government analyzed; also, we will analyze if there are other ways to provide 
funds for national defense less prone to create problems of collective action 
than interventionism in money and banking.
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RESUMEN
El propósito de este trabajo es evaluar si hay un argumento a favor de la 
“banca central” que no se pueda aislar de los terrenos económicos y 
morales. Para realizar esta investigación, se discutirá de manera filosófica si 
las instituciones privadas con libertad para contratar y buenas entradas tienen 
un mayor valor al de la defensa nacional puesto que es la última justificación 
vigente para las prerrogativas económicas analizadas por el gobierno. De 
igual forma, analizaremos si hay otras formas de proveer fondos para la 
defensa nacional menos propensas a crear problemas de acción colectiva 
que el intervencionismo en el dinero y la banca.
Palabras clave: Banca central, intervencionismo, dinero y regulaciones 
bancarias.
Clasificación JEL: E42, E58, E63, G28, H56.
Trabajo relacionado con: (3) Propiedad, (9) Regulaciones de Mercado, (13) Regulaciones 
Financieras, (22) Impuestos, y (25) Economía Política y Escogencia Pública.
RESUMO
O propósito deste trabalho é avaliar se há um argumento a favor do “banco 
central” que não possa isolar-se dos terrenos econômicos e morais. Para 
realizar esta pesquisa, discutirar-se-á de maneira filosófica se as instituições 
privadas com liberdade para contratar e boas entradas têm um maior 
valor ao da defesa nacional posto que é a última justificação vigente para 
as prerrogativas econômicas analisadas pelo governo. De igual forma, 
analisaremos se existem outras formas de prover fundos para a defesa 
nacional menos propensas a criar problemas de ação coletiva que o 
intervencionismo no dinheiro e no banco. 
Palavras chave: Banco central, intervencionismo, dinheiro e regulações 
bancárias.
Classificação JEL: E42, E58, E63, G28, H56.
Trabajo relacionado con: (3) Propiedad, (9) Regulaciones de Mercado, (13) Regulaciones 
Financieras, (22) Impuestos, y (25) Economía Política y Escogencia Pública.
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RÉSUMÉ
Le but de ce travail est d’évaluer s’il existe un argument en faveur de la banque 
centrale qui ne peut pas être mis de côté ou comme un autre motif économique 
ou moral. Pour faire une telle enquête, il sera discuté philosophiquement 
si les institutions de la propriété privée et la liberté contractuelle en argent 
général et bonne en particulier, sont d’une valeur supérieure à la défense 
nationale, étant donné que c’est la dernière justification de longue date pour 
les prérogatives monétaires du gouvernement analysé; aussi, nous analysons 
si il ya d’autres façons de fournir des fonds pour la défense nationale moins 
enclins à créer des problèmes d’action collective que l’interventionnisme de 
l’argent et des banques.
Mots-clés: Banque centrale, interventionnisme, de l’argent et la 
réglementation bancaire.
Classification JEL: E42, E58, E63, G28, H56.
Le sujet du document est liée à: (3) Propriété (9) Le règlement du marché, (13) 
Règlement financier, (22) Impôts et (25) l’économie politique et le Public Choice.
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The goal with the present inquiry is to evaluate if there is an argument that I 
cannot put aside in favor of “central banking;” and by central banking I mean 
the government’s prerogative to regulate money and credit. I start by identifying 
three different categories of arguments in favor of central banking and I have 
confidence that I have found sufficient grounds to dismiss the first two. In 
order to deal with the third argument, this work will discuss philosophically 
whether the institutions of private property and freedom of contract in general 
and good money1 in particular are of a higher value than national defense; 
also we will analyze if there are other ways to provide funds for national 
1 All my reasoning about money follows from the axiom that the development of the economic 
capacities of a group of individuals is directly related to the extension of the division of labor 
among them. Since in human societies the individuals possess specific, local knowledge 
and subjective as well as technical knowledge about the opportunities for economic activity, 
the capacity to exercise this “intellectual division of labor” is key for overcoming scarcity, 
as Professor Jesús Huerta de Soto points out by quoting Mises’ Liberalism (Huerta de Soto, 
2001, p. 173). History has demonstrated that the best institutions for this purpose are 
the ones that grant the individuals better opportunities for them to exercise their creativity 
and their other productive capacities; namely the classical liberal institutions of limited and 
representative government under the rule of law and individual rights, and paramount 
among them: private property rights, freedom of contract and the availability of adequate 
money as an instrument for indirect exchanges. Since any monetary arrangement in conflict 
with private property rights and freedom of contract is less than ideal, the many examples 
in history in which governments have intervened in the supply of money have resulted in the 
production of money less than adequate for its purpose.
27Criterio Libre / Año 11 / No. 19 / Bogotá (Colombia) / Julio-Diciembre 2013 / ISSN 1900-0642
Leonidas Zelmanovitz
defense instead of manipulation of money and 
credit and by that I mean the enforcement of rules 
for money and credit that would infringe private 
property rights and freedom of contract2.
There are many arguments in favor of the 
government’s monetary prerogatives. Such 
prerogatives generally include the power to 
define what can be used as money, who will be 
authorized to produce it, what the rules are, if any, 
for its production. It also includes the power to 
authorize banks to operate and regulate them, 
and perhaps, most importantly, how those powers 
will be used as an instrument for government’s 
policies; that is, the ways in which monetary and 
fiscal policy will be deployed to mutually support 
each other and the ultimate goals of the State. The 
government may use its prerogative benignly or 
malignly. A benign use of monetary prerogatives 
by the government would be the definition of a 
monetary regime with no forced tender, allowing 
competitive supply of money, for instance. A 
malign use of the monetary prerogatives happens 
when the government manipulates money and 
credit and by that I mean the enforcement of rules 
for money and credit that would infringe property 
rights and freedom of contract3.
Since it is the existence of the monetary 
prerogatives which gives occasion for monetary 
manipulation, an important question to ask is on 
which grounds such prerogative is advocated. In 
its modern incarnation, most of the interventionism 
in money and banking has been delegated to a 
government’s agency generally called central 
bank. Although that was not so in the past, a 
modern discussion about monetary prerogatives 
is, in essence, a discussion about the justifications 
for central banking. 
Central banks’ primary purpose in regard to 
the economic life of a country is to provide a 
medium of exchange where a single medium of 
exchange is permitted or to regulate its supply 
where there are competing suppliers. Since 
banking everywhere is fractional reserve banking 
to a greater or lesser extent, there is always a risk 
of crisis of liquidity at short notice in the banking 
industry, and therefore, a second important 
responsibility of the central bank is to be the 
“lender of last resort” for the financial system. 
And most, if not all, responsibilities of a central 
bank towards the private sector are encompassed 
in these two categories. But central banks have 
another purpose, actually their original purpose, 
that is, they are agents of the government’s 
treasury; they are responsible for facilitating 
public funding either by helping the government 
to borrowor by directly crediting the government’s 
newly produced money.
That is why we cannot discuss the rationale for 
central banking without taking into account fiscal 
policy; or as stated by Vera Smith “… it must be 
admitted that it is almost certain that by far most 
powerful reason leading to the maintenance of 
Government intervention in the banking sphere, 
at a time when it was on the decline in other 
industries, was that power over the issue of paper 
money, whether such power is direct or indirect, is 
an exceedingly welcome weapon in the armory of 
State finance” (1990, p. 9). Said differently, central 
2 Elsewhere (Zelmanovitz, L. (2010) Money and War in Murray Rothbard’s. A History of Money and Banking in the United 
States, Libertarian Papers 2, 17. Online at: libertarianpapers.org.) I have offered a presentation and an interpretation of a 
historical view on the relation between the fiscal necessities brought about by war and interventionism in money and banking 
in the United States up to World War I, with the purpose of illustrating the theoretical questions in regard to monetary policy 
and war finance, some of the arguments presented there are repeated here. Also, there are other arguments presented here 
that were previously discussed in the broader context of my Doctoral dissertation “Money - what is it and what is it for? - The 
ontology and functionality of money - A dissertation on the philosophical fundamentals of monetary institutions.” Still, the 
inquiry conduced here is a novel one, as it will become clear in the following pages. 
3 The exercise of monetary prerogatives may be equated to the power to establish a “monetary constitution.” The “constitutional” 
rules about money and credit do not necessarily infringe private property rights and freedom of contract. For instance, the 
definition of a unit of account that the economic agents may use in their calculations, or the supply of a medium of exchange 
stable in value would be an exercise of such prerogatives without infringement of private property and freedom of contract. 
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banks perform their roles as money providers, 
lenders of last resort and all other instrumental 
functions in order to better perform its original 
function, that is, to become a better agent to the 
State in general and particularly to the fisc4.
A discussion about the rationale for central 
banking should, therefore, be divided between 
justifications in regard to the central bank’s role 
for the private sector and in regard to its role as 
a direct arm of the treasury and indirectly of State 
policy in general.
That money does not need to be monopolistically 
produced or to have its supply regulated by the 
State can be attested by the fact that money 
monopolistically produced in one jurisdiction may 
be use voluntarily by the economic agents in other 
jurisdictions as it has been the case for millennia. 
Since the historical evidence demonstrates that the 
government’s monopoly on money production is 
not a necessary condition to have a medium of 
exchange available to the economic agents to 
facilitate their indirect transactions, that should be 
discarded as the reason for such monopoly5.
But how about the group efficiency effect, where 
gains to all agents may be accrued from the fact 
they are using the same currency? This argument 
of efficiency in itself cannot be denied, although 
the transaction costs minimized by the use of a 
common currency may be overstated in these days 
of electronic and instantaneous transactions6. The 
main issue here is that to the extent that the use 
of a single currency offers economic benefits to 
the individual agents, it is for them to discover 
and establish that by the sum of their individual 
decisions; since it may be the case that apparent 
or real benefits do not pay off in comparison 
with the costs associated to the use of multiple 
currencies. In any case, the economic argument 
for the benefits of using a single currency, 
everything else being equal, is not an argument 
for the imposition of a monopoly, something that 
with the excuse of giving something of value to the 
economic agents is taking from them the capacity 
to judge the supposed benefit by themselves, 
what is morally wrong, evidently. Other argument 
to give the State the power to regulate money is 
Hamilton’s argument in the 1791’s “Report on the 
establishment of a mint” that the money produced 
by other sovereigns may not be reliable, as it was 
evidenced by the debasement of the Spanish silver 
coin named “Dollar” at the end of the eighteenth 
century, when it was the most important medium of 
exchange and unit of account in the new republic 
of the United States of America7. Sound as that 
argument may be, it does not follow, that giving 
4 One may argue that there were no fiscal considerations in play at the creation of the Federal Reserve System (FRS) as the fourth 
central bank in the United States; true or false as that may be, that does not diminish the fact that the previous three central 
banks (The Bank of North America, The First Bank of the U.S., and the Second Bank of the U.S.) were created primarily with 
that purpose in mind and that the bank created in 1913, was completely mobilized as an agent of the Treasury by 1917 and 
has performed that role ever since. In regard to the Bank of England, however, there is no doubt that not only it was established 
in 1694 in order to provide funds to the British Crown but also that privileges such as the management of the National Debt, 
the acceptance of its notes in payment of taxes, and later the granting of legal tender status to them, among others were 
extended in order to facilitate the bank’s purpose as an instrument of War finance.
5 Even after the establishment of a mint, in the United States, foreign coins had legal tender status as late as 1854 (the Spanish 
Silver Dollar retained that status until 1857), demonstrating that a monopoly of money supply is not a necessary requirement 
to have money supplied. The relative merits of providing the supply of money either monopolistically or competitively is a 
different discussion.
6 For instance, credit card companies incorporate the cost of foreign exchange transactions in their regular fees for some credit 
card contracts they offer in order to have more businesses, what allows some of their customers to do transactions in multiple 
currencies for no additional costs other than what they implicitly pay for transactions in their domestic currencies.
7 “The dollar originally contemplated in the money transactions of this country, by successive diminutions of its weight and 
fineness, has sustained a depreciation of five per cent., and yet the new dollar has a currency, in all payments in place of the 
old, with scarcely any attention to the difference between them. The operation of this in depreciating the value of property, 
depending upon past contracts, and (as far as inattention to the alteration in the coin may be supposed to leave prices 
stationary) of all other property, is apparent. Nor can it require argument to prove that a nation ought not to suffer the value of 
the property of its citizens to fluctuate with the fluctuations of a foreign mint, and to change with the changes in the regulations 
of a foreign sovereign” (Hamilton, 1904). 
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monopolistic powers to the U.S. Government or to 
any government for that matter to regulate money 
would result in better money than allowing the use 
of money supplied competitively. To limit for now 
the argument about what constitutes good money 
to the criterion of stability of value, the history of 
a State monopoly on money has been one that 
demonstrates that governments do not necessarily 
produce good and reliable money8 even when 
constrained by self-imposed constraints such as a 
clause of convertibility; after all, those clauses can 
always be rescinded. So, the goal to assure “good” 
money is also a rationale for central banking that 
can be falsified; that is, central banking is neither 
a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition 
to have good money. You can have good money 
without central banking and central banking does 
not guarantee good money9.
That leaves us with the conclusion that the reason 
why governments establish such monopoly is 
neither because that is necessary in order to 
have money available to the economic agents, 
nor because that allows them to produce better 
money than otherwise.
Returning to our assumption that the purposes of 
the modern usage of the monetary prerogatives 
through a central bank fulfills the three purposes 
8 Cases of debasement of the national currency, at the time 
of commodity money, and cases of inflation of the money 
supply by the Sovereign, in cases in which convertibility 
was suspended temporarily or definitively, are well known 
and so many to be enumerated. 
9 All the historical examples of debasement, suspension 
of convertibility and inflation demonstrate beyond doubt 
that central banking does not guarantee good money, 
but good money being supplied without central banking 
requires some explanation. The argument here is that 
in the absence of forced tender, the economic agents 
will choose the money that best suit their necessities; 
it may be the US Dollar in Panama or Ecuador, or the 
Spanish Silver Dollar during colonial times and later in 
the Antebellum USA. It is not an argument that there 
will always be a better money available than the one 
provided by the central bank, but that the monopoly 
of the money supply as embodied by the central banks 
worldwide, because of the attribute of being a monopoly, 
precludes the possibility of the economic agents to use a 
better money that may be available.
“That money does not 
need to be monopolistically 
produced or to have its supply 
regulated by the State can be 
attested by the fact that money 
monopolistically produced in 
one jurisdiction may be use 
voluntarily by the economic 
agents in other jurisdictions 
as it has been the case 
for millennia.”
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of (i) providing money to the daily economic 
activity of the citizenry, (ii) acting as a lender of 
last resort and (iii) helping the government in their 
political goals and having disposed of the first 
of the three possible rationales, we are left then 
with the other two hypothesis for governments to 
assume a monopoly of money production. The 
first is to be a better lender of last resort and the 
second because that allows the central bank to 
better fulfill its role as enabler of the fisc.
In absolute terms, the existence of a lender 
of last resort is not a necessary condition for a 
monetary economy is also attested by the fact 
that for millennia there was none; but perhaps 
one may say that it was unfortunate that it took 
so long to create a lender of last resort. Then, the 
argument for central banking based on the need 
for a lender of last resort must shift towards the 
question about whether central banking allows a 
swifter adjustment of the economy to economic 
fluctuations10.
One may argue that an inflexible supply of 
money may not leave enough wiggle room for 
adjustments to sudden or even secular changes 
in the demand for money without sudden or 
continuous changes in the value of money, that 
would be detrimental to economic development 
and, therefore, the existence of a government’s 
agency with the authority and the instruments to 
make changes in the money supply is necessary in 
order to avoid economic shocks.
However, in order for the central bank to have 
the instruments to make changes in the supply of 
money by fiat, either the government establishes a 
legal monopoly of money production that allows 
it to create base money by fiat, or the government 
allows inflationary credit creationdirectly or 
10 The lender of last resort argument for central banking 
and the flexibility of the money supply as an instrument 
to smooth economic fluctuations are folded together 
because the former only becomes necessary once the 
government intervenes with money and banking in 
order to achieve the latter as it will be explained in the 
next paragraphs. 
“If  the banking system can 
create multiple claims over 
the same amount of  financial 
resources (for instance, by 
lending money at longer 
maturities than the maturities 
required from the depositors 
to retrieve their deposits) that 
allow the banking system 
to allocate resources as they 
see fit; it may be based on 
a criterion of  economic 
efficiency, it may be based on 
a political mandate.”
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indirectly, that is, the creation of credits without 
the preexisting savings, something done through 
fractional reserve arrangements in a broad sense.
However, a banking system organized under 
fractional reserve arrangements, that is, a 
system, which financial intermediaries are not 
only leveraged but there are time mismatches in 
the financial operations as well, is a system that, 
on one hand, can mobilize existing savingsmore 
rapidly and to a greater extent by funneling them to 
particular uses, among them supplying the treasury 
with funds; on the other hand, it is more unstable.
If the banking system can create multiple claims 
over the same amount of financial resources (for 
instance, by lending money at longer maturities 
than the maturities required from the depositors to 
retrieve their deposits) that allow the banking system 
to allocate resources as they see fit; it may be 
based on a criterion of economic efficiency, it may 
be based on a political mandate. The fact is that, 
under fractional reserve arrangements, the bankers 
and the politicians with power to regulate the banks 
can mobilize resources in a scale and with a speed 
that otherwise they would not be able to. And note 
that that can be done in any arrangement that 
allows the creation of multiple simultaneous claims 
over the same resources, not only in the case of 
fractional reserves on demand deposits.
The problem with leverage (borrowing in order 
to lend) and time mismatches (borrowing with 
shorter maturities than the maturities of the 
lending activities) is that sometimes in periods 
in which there are crises of confidence in the 
banking system or periods of increased demand 
for liquidity not necessarily associated with a 
confidence crisis in the banking system, the 
banks are forced to “de-leverage”, that is, to call 
back the loans they made in order to repay the 
investors/depositors. Since the very essence of the 
system is the creation of multiple financial claims 
over the same amount of base money, or said 
differently, of multiple claims on the monetary side 
of the economy not represented on the real side 
of the economy for actual goods, that liquidation 
becomes problematic. 
It is under such arrangements of multiple claims 
over same assets and time mismatches that 
a lender of last resort becomes an important 
component of the system, an essential component 
of the system. But if not for the significantly 
improved conditions for the banking system to 
fund the government under such arrangements, 
it is doubtful that that would be the “architecture” 
of choice for a financial system and therefore for 
the need of a central bank; or saying it differently: 
- what compels the government to come to the 
rescue of the banks in times of crisis of liquidity 
if not for the need governments have to tap in 
the inflationary creation of credits conjured by the 
banks through fractional reserve banking?
Not long ago (before 1844), the ratio of 
reserves to bank liabilities in England was about 
30%; when the role of the BoE as the lender 
of last resort became known and trusted, that 
ratio started to decline.Aside from the general 
interest in having a healthy financial system as 
an instrument for economic growth that most 
politicians have, the State has a vested interest in 
the solvency of the banking system to the extent 
that the banks are agents of the treasury in its 
effort to raise liquidity to fund public expenses. 
However, that role is limited when money 
production is limited by external factors, such 
as the refusal by the economic agents, both 
domestically and abroad, to accept things other 
than precious metals as money and to accept 
those only at their intrinsic value and not at their 
face value. But today, base money is everywhere 
fiat money, so, at least for mainstream theorists, 
central banks around the world can increase 
the money supply and drive down interest rates 
on treasury bonds almost indefinitely and that 
allows them to be a more effective lender of last 
resort than before.
But one should not accept that a fiat money 
regime allows for easier increases of the money 
supply and see in that a good thing when the 
government is supporting the banks; after all, 
if not forced to divert saving to fund the public 
debt in one way or other, and not being caught 
in the moral hazard problem that a lender of last 
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resort creates, the banks would not have needed 
a lender of last resort in first place11.
So, on what the answer to the question whether 
a central bank with the power to manipulate the 
money supply either by the inflationary creation 
of money or by credit is a stabilizer factor in the 
economy and therefore an acceptable rationale 
for central bank depends? It depends on the idea 
that the banking arrangements are not only of the 
fractional reserve kind but that there is the implicit 
or explicit guarantee given by the government 
that they will come to the rescue of the financial 
system if needed. And the bankers may be sure of 
such a thing, because the government, if nothing 
else, needs the financial system to float the public 
debt. If not for the need to place public debt in the 
market, the government would be freer to make 
clear to the economic agents in general that a 
rescue of the banks with public funds, real or 
inflationary, is not to be expected, and therefore, 
the banks would be required to operate much 
more prudently than otherwise.
To conclude, the argument that central banks are 
necessary to act as lenders of last resort in order 
to give stability to the financial system starts from 
the premise that central banks add more stability 
than the instability they bring. That presumption 
obviously is a praesumptio iuristantum, that 
is, a rebuttable presumption; therefore, this 
assumption only offers a rationale for central 
banking if proved that the net result of central 
banking is superior to the result in the absence 
of central banking. If not for the guarantee that 
the government will intervene to provide liquidity 
for the banks, guarantee that becomes credible 
only when the government depends on the banks 
for its fiscal needs, the banks would be more 
prudent and the lender of last resort would not 
be necessary. 
Of course if the government needs the banks 
to pool individual’s savings in order to fund the 
public debt, the banking system will be less stable 
than otherwise and therefore, the presence of a 
lender of last resort becomes a stabilizing factor; 
but absent that need, mere existence of a lender 
of last resort induces non-prudent behavior. 
So, as exemplified by the historical evidence, we 
can also reject on logic grounds that a lender of 
last resort is a stabilizing factor in the economy 
and therefore it is an acceptable rationale for 
central banking, since that is only the case when 
the government fiscal needs impose on the banks 
a pressure to act irresponsibly.
Having attributed the very need of a lender of last 
resort to the instabilities introduced in the banking 
system by the privileges granted to them by the 
government (being incidentally the access to a 
lender of last resort part of them), that leaves us 
with one hypothesis to analyze, that is, with the 
rationale for central banking based on its function 
as an instrument for State policy, in particular, 
State financing.
Regardless of what event we chose as our 
departing point for the history of central banking, 
either the establishment of the Bank of England 
(BoE) or the Peel’s Act which gave monopoly of 
issuance to the BoE, we will see that governments 
saw it to be for their benefit to authorize an agent 
to produce and regulate the money supply as an 
instrument to create a market for public debt. 
11 Since we are dealing with counterfactuals, I can only support this claim with the logical argument that a lender of last resort 
only becomes necessary when the banks operate not only with fractional reserves, but also with time mismatches, being a bank 
operation under fractional reserves but no time mismatches the kind of operation recommended by the “Real Bills” doctrine, 
for instance. Fractional reserve banking and time mismatches may occur without the moral hazard created by a lender of last 
resort or the implicit (or explicit) guarantee by the government that convertibility will be suspended or deposits on demand will 
be frozen if needed but they tend to be isolated events, given that the consequence of reckless behavior is bankrupcy; they 
become systemic events when the bankers know that the government will not allow them to go broke and that happens when 
they know that the government needs them to pool short-term savings to float long-term public debts, that is, the government 
needs them to do exactly what will make their banks insolvents in the event that confidence is lost. 
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And the most pressing necessity that governments 
may face that forces them to raise money quickly 
is the necessity of national defense. We could 
expand this concept to encompass all threats to 
the survival of a given political regime, not only 
external but also internal, not only conventional 
war, but also rebellion. However, that expansion 
of the concept of national defense for the 
purposes of this paper would only complicate 
things unnecessarily; so for the purposes of the 
argument presented here, national defense will 
be considered as an external military threat not 
only to the political regime, but to the lives and 
properties of all citizenry as well. 
2. THE PROBLEM WAR FINANCE POSES FOR 
THE INTEGRITY OF 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
Among all the possible justifications for the 
intrusions on private property rights in general 
and by the manipulation of money and banking 
rules in particular, the needs of war financing 
seem to carry more weight than anything else. 
Individuals prepared to resist attacks on private 
property rights based on any other reason face 
moral doubts once confronted with the needs to 
fund defense. What is the rationale behind the 
apparent difference in value judgment in the case 
of war finance?
In dealing with moral justifications for taxation, 
Eric Mack sees private property rights as: “a moral 
presumption against forced takings, a presumption 
that might, at least in principle, be overcome in 
special cases - specifically, cases that do not fit 
the paradigm of unjustified forced redistribution” 
(1986, p. 489). Professor Mack goes on saying 
that he finds no sufficient basis to actually overthrow 
that presumption “unless, of course, one retreats to 
utilitarianism” (1986, p. 509). Most people would 
accept social utility as perfectly acceptable moral 
criterion to evaluate the morality of taxation, but 
let’s try first without that.
“Of  course if  the 
government needs the banks 
to pool individual’s savings in 
order to fund the public debt, 
the banking system will be 
less stable than otherwise and 
therefore, the presence of  a 
lender of  last resort becomes a 
stabilizing factor; but absent 
that need, mere existence of  
a lender of  last resort induces 
non-prudent behavior.”
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The “special case” referred by Prof. Mack is 
the case of an “authentic” public good, and 
national defense is the quintessential one; so, 
the recourse to voluntary financing of national 
defense would imply accepting a distribution of 
benefits not proportional to the contributions 
in favor of the “free-riders,” what is morally 
acceptable from a right’s perspective, so long as 
all the contributors are better off. Nonetheless, 
Professor Mack argues that national defense 
financed by coercion, that is, taxation, still 
needs to pass the test of proving that it is 
provided in an efficient manner and that “even 
if social utility were thereby greatly enhanced” 
(1986, p. 509), that no group of individuals will 
be worse off.
But since in the real world we live in, knowledge 
is extremely imperfect, Professor Mack proposes 
a litmus test to find out ifit is morally acceptable 
in a given circumstance of tax financed national 
defense; and the test consists in a comparison 
with a “genuinely defensive system, one truly 
protective of our lives, liberties, and property” 
(1986, p. 511). If the cost of that system were in 
the “ball-park” of current levels of expenditure, 
the tax financed national defense would 
beacceptablein principle.
Yet, Professor Mack believes that it would be 
possible to finance national defense voluntarily; 
the economic gains of an effective defense system 
would bring the cost to what is acceptable to a 
“rational purchaser” regardless of the fact that 
there are free-riders.
I disagree with his conclusion, but I think that 
his proposed test offers a practical instrument 
to evaluate the morality of coercive financing 
of national defense without descending in a 
utilitarian calculation that Mack clearly rejects.
There are two elements that I would add to be 
factored in his proposed method of assessment; and 
the first one is that the size of the army you need to 
field is not an ideal number, but it is a consequence 
of the strength of the forces you face, as stated by 
“The requirements of  defense 
of  individual rights to life and 
property cannot be evaluated 
in a metaphysical and 
epistemological vacuum. Being 
mankind who we are, being 
human political societies what 
they are, it is not reasonable 
to expect that national defense 
could be effectively conducted 
by any other means other than 
by a permanent apparatus of  
military defense funded not 
voluntarily according to the 
personal preferences of  each 
individual, but compulsorily. 
Negating that is tantamount 
to negating reality.”
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Hobbes12. Even if it would be possible to know what 
the personal preference for security of each individual 
is and to give a price tag to that, something that is not 
possible, still, we can know for certain that the cost 
of national defense is not related to the aggregate 
of those figures. The cost of national defense is 
determined by the military threats the nation faces 
and not by any internal circumstance. Therefore, 
if protection of life and property is of personal 
value for all individuals, in different circumstances, 
different efforts may be necessary, regardless of their 
individual preferences13.
The other element, also from Hobbes, is that the 
arrangements for defense need to be permanent: 
“Nor is it enough for security, which men desire 
should last all the time of their life, that they be 
governed and directed by one judgment for a 
limited time, as in one battle or one war” (1994, 
p. 107). And that makes sense. The apparatus of 
defense should be built to protect not only against 
existing threats, but also potential threats and there 
are gains of specialization in this field of endeavor 
as in any other; therefore, the effective defense 
of lives and properties of every individual citizen 
requires a permanent organization, reasonably, 
prudently supplied with means to dissuade and if 
necessary to confront military threats.
The requirements of defense of individual rights 
to life and property cannot be evaluated in a 
metaphysical and epistemological vacuum. Being 
mankind who we are, being human political 
societies what they are, it is not reasonable to 
expect that national defense could be effectively 
conducted by any other means other than by 
a permanent apparatus of military defense 
funded not voluntarily according to the personal 
preferences of each individual, but compulsorily. 
Negating that is tantamount to negating reality. 
And the morality of such system should not be 
condemned by the mere fact that it is funded by 
taxation; but by an evaluation of the entire context 
in regard to its efficacy and reasonableness, by 
considering, for instance: (a) whether tax funded 
defense has been consented among the individual 
members of a given polity by the legitimate 
instruments of collective decision, (b) whether 
the means of legitimate coercion are used only 
to achieve that purpose or if some redistribution 
is also pursued, (c) whether individual rights 
are observed, including property rights (albeit 
mitigated by the provision for defense), (d) if the 
total cost estimated for national defense meets 
Mack’s criterion of being measurable with the 
cost of the same service provided by a private 
rational agency, etcetera14.
12 “The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the 
enemy we fear, and is then sufficient, when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine 
the event of war, as to move him to attempt” (Hobbes, 1994, p. 107).
13 One may say that not everybody values his life or the life of his family so highly as to fight for them and therefore it would be an 
infringement of their rights to ask them for their blood or treasury for the common defense. However, I think that a distinction 
can be made between the “blood tax” of conscription and taxation no matter how onerous a given taxation may be. The 
most desperate circumstances do not give the sovereign a right to enslave his subjects and to force them to fight, nor I think 
that a suicidal defense or a confiscation and commitment of the destruction of everything that is valuable in order to try to 
prevent their loss is morally justifiable. In deciding what to commit to national defense, the sovereign needs to apply practical 
reasoning, prudence, as with everything else in life, and a sensible form of government is one that makes rulers accountable 
to the people for that. Furthermore, the right not to be forced into the army and the right to sell one’s goods and emigrate 
is part of the individual rights which all human beings are entitled to. But once a situation of emergency has started, if your 
property is needed for common defense, as it will be argued with this paper, the right you have is to expect compensation, 
once the emergency has ceased and conditioned to the sovereign not having been defeated. 
14 As previously stated, the sum of individual preferences is not the only determinant of the amount to be raised for national 
defense, since external circumstances such as the size of the military threat faced by a given society and the need to keep a 
standing army are not determined by the sum of those preferences. However, the ex ante conclusion of a cost and benefit 
analysis between the expenditures of national defense and the value of the life and property that each individual has in that 
given society is a determinant factor in each one’s assessment that he is a net gainer or a net loser for each level of expenditure 
and may determine whether he judges that the best option is to leave that society or to surrender that society whose defense, 
according to his or her criterion of evaluation, does not pay off to defend. Under assumptions of perfect knowledge, it 
would be possible to talk about an objective assessment of all the values involved in such decision, and the closer each 
subjective decision maker comes to that objective evaluation, the better, but ultimately, each individual will decide based on 
the knowledge about his internal and external circumstances he possesses and, of course, he may be wrong in objective terms.
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For more than a century now, the main divide 
about the nature of money has been between 
those who see money as a spontaneously evolved 
institution in society whose purpose is allowing 
and enhancing the division of labor, and those 
who see money as an institution created by 
the State as an instrument for its policies. The 
debate about war finance, in all its dimensions, 
from the description of its instruments to the 
evaluation of their efficacy and the justifications 
for their use in each given circumstance, may be 
better understood in the context provided by the 
discussion on the nature of money. If money is 
just one more instrument for the implementation 
of State policies, then there are no limits in that 
regard to what the government can do to money. 
On the other hand, if money is understood as the 
instrument for indirect exchanges, then there are 
ethical limits to what can be done to money. A 
precise understanding about what money is may 
inform the best ways to provide for war finance 
when necessary.
And as stated above, it is axiomatic that money 
was introduced in society and its main function 
still is to facilitate indirect exchanges; and in that 
regard, the introduction of specific forms of money, 
including credit or State money, only becomes 
possible, and ultimately successful, because 
they perform that basic function. So, the fact 
that some monies, including our monies today, 
may have been introduced by the State does not 
contradict the thesis that instruments of facilitating 
indirect exchanges are introduced in society not 
by command but because they perform a useful 
function for the individuals.
So, not even (what I would recognize as a genetic 
fallacy) stating that money was created by the 
State and therefore its main purpose is to be an 
instrument for the State gives legitimacy to the 
claim that because our monies were created by 
the State, the rulers can do whatever they wish 
with money as if there were no moral constraints. 
Money becomes and remains a morally accepted 
instrument for the State to the extent that it 
remains adequate for its basic function; and its 
basic function is to enhance the division of labor 
in society, not to serve State’s policies. 
So far we have talked about justifications for 
central banking without trying to distinguish 
what kind of justifications they are. Basically, 
we are in search of justifications on grounds of 
economics and ethics. Our understanding is that 
justifications on those grounds would appeal to 
all constituencies interested in this topic. And the 
matrix of our inquiry, so far, is the following:
3. THE NATURE OF MONEY AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR   THE DEBATE ON WAR FINANCE 
Table 1. Matrix of rationales for central banking
Justifications for central 
banking Economic grounds Ethical grounds
A Central Bank is necessary 
in order to have (good) 
money provided for society
Central banking is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to have good money; no solid economic case for 
central banking based on the monopoly of money 
production exists. The group efficiency effect 
argument for the selection of a single currency 
does not imply that such currency should be 
provided without competition.
Central banking is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to have good money; no 
solid moral case for central banking 
based on the monopoly of money 
production exists. Stealing from the 
individuals the right to use a currency 
of their choice is morally wrong.
A central bank is necessary 
in order to have a stable 
financial system by its actions 
as a (effective) lender of last 
resort
Central banking allows effective lending of last 
resort under fiat money and fractional reserve 
arrangements, which are unstable by nature, 
defeating the purpose of greater stability through 
central banking.
There are no necessary social good 
achievable through central banking 
whose deficiency is not a consequence 
of the introduction of central banking.
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Justifications for central 
banking Economic grounds Ethical grounds
A central bank is a (relevant) 
instrument of the fisc in cases 
of emergencies. 
The mitigation of private property by the 
manipulation of money may be the best way to 
have fast access to real existing savings under 
emergencies, short-term extreme circumstances, 
but a strong real economic sector, “deep” 
financial markets, and sound management of 
public finances are the most efficient policy for 
peacetime and all but extreme cases, as a way 
for the State to have access to existing goods 
necessary to wage war.
In case of war, is the survival of the 
political body a “higher value” than 
private property rights? Is the “fiscal 
proviso” morally justifiable? My 
answer is yes, it is.
But since it is not possible to evaluate 
morally central banking regardless of 
its economic efficiency, this answer 
admits important qualifications.
4. INSTRUMENTS FOR WAR FINANCE AND THE SINEWS OF POWER
In order to compare the economic consequences 
of the different methods of war financing, it seems 
advisable to start describing those methods. 
Following Mises in Nation, State, and Economy, 
Professor Gabriel Calzada Alvares separates 
the methods into four categories: conscription-
confiscation, taxation, inflation, and war bonds 
(Calzada, 2005, p. 149)15.
In the context of Mises’ distinction between 
a “Soldier’s War,” a somewhat limited form 
of war that may be compatible with a market 
economy and civilization itself, and “Total War,” 
conscription, or the “Blood Tax” as Mises used to 
call it, is the very beginning of unlimited warfare. 
The rationale that may be inferred here is that 
once the populace consents to the government 
enslaving part of the citizenry and potentially 
sending them to death, any other limitation on the 
power of government, such as private property, 
free speech, whatever, loses its legitimacy. After 
all, how can someone have the right to refuse to 
give up his property if others are forced to give 
their lives?16.
Regarding confiscation, according to Professor 
Calzada, the taking of already produced goods 
and means of production would eliminate 
the incentives for entrepreneurs to make the 
necessary adjustments to transform the structure 
of production in order to deliver war supplies; 
therefore it is a self-defeating method. 
Considering taxation, inflation, and public debt 
as instruments to raise the resources to wage war, 
it is important to take into consideration Mises’ 
lesson that “War can be waged only with present 
goods” (Mises, 2006, p. 139). Accepting Mises’ 
assumption, from an economic standpoint, i.e. 
deciding on the use of the scarce resources 
available, a generation that wages war must bear 
its material cost. 
However, since most of the wealth of the individuals 
is not usually kept in liquid assets, but in illiquid 
ones, it must be understood that sometimes the 
share of the existing wealth that is required for 
the war effort is bigger than what can possibly be 
taken from the tax-payers without forcing them 
to fire-sell non-liquid assets, producing strong 
redistributive impacts; or, simply, the State might 
not have the tax-collection mechanisms to raise 
the amount required in a timely and orderly 
manner. These are considerations that may lead 
15 See Mises (2006) Covering the State’s War Costs, Nation, State, and the Economy. 
16 The same point is made by Professor Robert Higgs in Crisis and Leviathan quoting the economist Wesley C. Mitchell, who 
wrote in 1943 that “When lives themselves are treated as means (to the end of military victory) so is property” (Higgs, 1987, 
p. 202).
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to the use of one form of taxation over others or 
may induce the government to have recourse to 
debt or inflation in order to respectively spread 
the burden of the material cost of the war among 
owners of liquid and illiquid assets and to collect 
more recourses than it would otherwise be 
possible to collect via direct taxation.
In concrete terms, the access to a broader pool 
of resources that debt allows in comparison with 
taxation (since taxation is always aimed at profits 
and revenue but not at the principal, it is aimed 
at the capital gains, but not at the capital) is 
what makes the capacity to fill the public coffers 
by raising liquid resources through financial 
instruments so essential in cases of war.
There are some goods that by their nature cannot 
be used for the war effort; still their owners may 
be called to pay for the acquisition of other goods 
that can have military use. Still, the mobilization 
of resources to wage war is limited to the capacity 
of the economy to produce military supplies, but 
that capacity is different from the capacity to pay 
for those supplies. 
Let’s assume, for instance, that in a given society 
there are 80 billion dollars in fixed assets and 
20 billion in liquid assets and at the same time 
the annual income is 12 billion and from that 
income, 8 billion is current expenditures and 4 
billion are investments. If it is for the government 
to wage war taxing only income or consumption, 
it is doubtful that more than say, 6 billion could 
be raised, and even that at an “economy of war” 
kind of economic system. However, if the war is 
financed with debt, some of the existing liquid 
assets and even some of the fixed assets can be 
mobilized for war production; to the extent that 
owners of liquid assets may buy war bonds and 
fixed assets may be diverted to war production if 
the State has the resources to pay for their use. 
Theoretically, war procurement could be, for 
some time, totally financed by debt without even 
denting civil consumption. Obviously, that is not 
sustainable in the long run and here is not the 
place to discuss why that is so. But it issufficient for 
“In concrete terms, the 
access to a broader pool of  
resources that debt allows in 
comparison with taxation 
(since taxation is always 
aimed at profits and revenue 
but not at the principal, it is 
aimed at the capital gains, 
but not at the capital) is what 
makes the capacity to fill the 
public coffers by raising liquid 
resources through financial 
instruments so essential in 
cases of  war.”
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our purposes to demonstrate that debt allows the 
government to draw resources from the existing 
wealth, while taxes only allow (without forcing 
fire-sale liquidations) to draw from the existing 
income; even if the goods diverted to war, in the 
end, are limited by the capacity of the economy to 
convert capital and other resources from their civil 
uses to military ones. 
5. THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND 
The classical account of the relation between 
money and war is P.G. M. Dickson’s The Financial 
Revolution in England - a Study in the Development 
of Public Credit 1688–1756. The central thesis 
of the book is that it was thanks to the capacity 
of the British Crown to raise money beyond its 
taxing capacity, through borrowing, that England 
was able to field the military forces necessary 
to succeed in war against France and its allies. 
So much so that a contemporary source (Issac 
de Pinto) states that the astonishing capture of 
Havana in 1762 “would not have been possible 
if one-third fewer ships and troops had been 
assigned to the task” (Dickson, 1967, p. 9). 
Professor Dickson then describes the features of 
the new system of public finance developed in 
that period, the development of the market for 
short-term and long-term public debt, and the 
relations between the treasury and the financial 
markets in general.
His argument about the relation between the fiscal 
necessities of the Crown and the development of 
British financial markets can be understood as 
operating in two directions; that is, the creation 
of a stable and efficient government was a 
precondition for the development of successful 
public borrowing in the same way that such 
borrowing ended up shaping, out of necessity, 
a more efficient and stable government in the 
United Kingdom.
Dickson’s argument was further developed in both 
directions by other authors. One direction, which 
is the more relevant for our purposes, is to say, 
as Niall Ferguson does17, that the existence of a 
central bank (formally introduced in the U.K. with 
the privilege of monopoly of issuance to the Bank 
of England by the Peel Act of 1844) is crucial for 
governments to deal with emergencies like wars 
by the flexibility in the money supply that they 
allow (2008, p. 100). For instance, talking about 
the reaction to the crisis of 1914 he writes, “Then, 
as now, the authorities reacted to a liquidity crisis 
by printing money” (2008, p. 301). 
The other direction is to stress the importance 
of the fiscal needs of the State forming and 
shaping financial markets. This direction is the 
one presented by Richard Sylla with his essay 
“Shaping the US Financial System, 1690-1913” 
in The State, the Financial System, and Economic 
Modernization. According to him, the financial 
requirements and policies of the State “determine 
the ways in which private financial institutions and 
markets emerge and develop” (Sylla et al., 2007, 
p. 250). For the author, the financial programme 
of Alexander Hamilton, which was aimed at 
providing one more weapon to the Republic’s 
arsenal, resulted in launching a banking system 
and a securities market in the United States; for 
him, the lesson of history is that “virtually” every 
major financial innovation is just a reaction to 
fiscal needs and policies. 
17 See Ferguson, N. (2008). Of Human Bondage, The Ascent of Money 
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Even if one disagrees with consequentialist 
justifications for what ought to be considered 
right, it is necessary to keep in mind that 
notwithstanding strong protection of private 
property rights, the lesson from the history of 
money and banking generally has been one 
of dilution of those rights, especially through 
interventions in the monetary and financial 
arrangements every time that the contingencies 
of war financing so require.
In the historical record, there are countless 
episodes in which, for fiscal reasons resulting from 
a state of war, a government intervened in the 
monetary institutions sometimes with disastrous 
effects for the economic performance of society 
and that is a reality that must be dealt with18.
Let’s assume, like Larry White and George Selgin 
do (Selgin and White, 1999), that the “fiscal 
necessities” are the ultimate justification for 
government’s control over money and banking, 
or in any case, that they are a better explanation 
than “market failures”19. After all, the evidence 
from history shows many occasions in which a 
sovereign rightly or wrongly, seeing no other 
means to wage war but by trumping private 
property rights, to the extent that he was able to do 
it, seized private property for that purpose. It is as 
if there is a “fiscal proviso” in the protection that a 
sovereign offers to private property rights. That is, 
sovereign powers have acted throughout history 
as if, under some circumstances, specifically in 
cases of armed struggle, the protection of private 
property was not absolute20.
Is an armed struggle an argument strong enough 
to overcome most, if not all, limitations on 
political power as well? Is this an argument of 
“realpolitik” (the government has the guns, they 
can take your horse, there is nothing you can do 
about that) or is there also a “moral” argument 
to be made? Is the preservation of peace or the 
survival of the polity a “higher” moral value than 
“mere” individual rights?
This is perhaps the opportunity to discuss whether 
there are other persuasive justifications to limit the 
state to a minimum than the moral tradition that 
evolved into individual rights, as argued by Robert 
Nozick, for instance. Or, in other words, for the 
thinkers not satisfied with Nozick’s claim that there 
is “an area in moral space around an individual” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. 54) that no one, even the polity, 
can trespass, are there other arguments to offer in 
favor of a State with limited powers? 
The argument in favor of an unlimited State is 
traditionally associated with the social contract 
described by Thomas Hobbes, in which the 
individuals surrender their liberty to the sovereign 
in exchange for protection against others. Since 
the entity then created by the covenant among 
those individuals, Hobbes’s Leviathan, has the 
right to prevent the use of violence and fraud 
among the contractors and to marshal them 
for the purpose of common defense. Since 
according to Hobbes, “whosoever has the right 
to the End, has right to the Means,” it follows 
that the sovereign has the “right” to use whatever 
means he deems expedient, including the private 
6. THE “FISCAL PROVISO” 
18 On that, Mariana’s remark, as quoted by Laures (2008, p.142), that “It is said that statesmen very often act according to the 
principle that necessity knows no law” should be taken at face value.
19 Arguments for fiscal needs as the ultimate justification for government’s intervention in monetary matters may be also found 
in David Glasner (2005, p. 36) and James Buchanan (2000) among others. Incidentally, Professor Buchanan’s description of 
the government as a “revenue-maximizing ogre” is a very illustrative one.
20 That, legally, private property rights are not absolute is a matter of positive law everywhere, to my knowledge; the issue 
discussed in this section is if ethically, in terms of reasoning about what is moral, one may find arguments against a conception 
of absolute rights.
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property of his subjects, to provide for the peace 
and security of the community. As the Hobbesian 
argument goes, the sovereign has legitimate 
authority to take any liberty his subjects have 
retained; and that seems to justify morally the 
fiscal proviso. But the problem with such line of 
reasoning is that it serves to justify anything else 
the sovereign might do. 
According to Professor Michael Levin, it is here 
that a distinction between Hobbes’s supposedly 
unlimited State and Nozick’s State, which is 
constrained by inalienable rights possessed 
by the individuals, may be drawn: “Nozick 
believes there are ‘side constrains’ on the 
State’s action even in pursuit of its legitimate 
goal, and thus disagrees with the end-means 
maxim. For him, the right to keep peace entails 
the right to means to keep peace which do 
not violate the side constraints” (Levin, 1982, 
p. 342); or in the words of Jan Narveson, 
for Nozick “… rights are rigid, incapable of 
being legitimately violated even for the sake 
of preventing wholesale further violation by 
others…” (Narveson, p. 324).
As Professor Levin argues, there are reasons for 
the contractors to give up their “swords” but not 
their “plows.” Essentially, it may be expected that 
once everyone abdicates the use of violence, 
even if the sovereign is not good at enforcing 
peace, the level of violence tends to diminish; 
at the extreme, if everyone adheres to the pact, 
the sovereign does not need to do anything to 
establish security. In relation to everything else, 
figuratively represented in Professor Levin’s paper 
by the “plows,” the sovereign, prima facie, cannot 
provide for the individuals by monopolizing the 
means to do so better than the individuals can do 
for themselves. 
This may be considered his central argument in 
favor of “A Hobbesian Minimal State”: there is no 
reason for the individuals in the state of nature to 
establish a social contract with a broader scope 
than surrendering to the sovereign their “swords” 
in exchange for the expectancy of peace and 
“Is an armed struggle an 
argument strong enough 
to overcome most, if  not 
all, limitations on political 
power as well? Is this an 
argument of  «realpolitik» 
(the government has the guns, 
they can take your horse, 
there is nothing you can do 
about that) or is there also 
a «moral» argument to be 
made? Is the preservation of  
peace or the survival 
of  the polity a «higher» 
moral value than «mere» 
individual rights?”
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security. Anything else the Leviathan decides to 
do is only justified in light of the original contract 
to the extent that it is necessary to achieve that 
goal; nothing else21.
Granted, the one who decides what is necessary 
is the sovereign, and that does not solve the 
problem that the fiscal proviso represents for the 
claim that individual rights in general and private 
property rights in particular are absolute, since the 
needs for defense may still justify expropriation of 
private property in the Hobbesian Minimal State. 
Furthermore, an argument against the fitness of 
absolutist States, with weak protection of individual 
rights to better provide peace and security than, 
say, a constitutionally limited government may be 
made on historical grounds. So, the “Hobbesian” 
covenant here may be understood as limitingthe 
degree which private property may be conditioned 
to the circumstancesto a minimum; justifying 
a protection of these rights, for all practical 
21 Admittedly, this “Hobbesian Minimal State” is a departure 
from the Hobbes mature ideas that all property rights are 
conventional and therefore the Sovereign is not limited 
by previously acquired property over “plows” since there 
were none previous to civil society; indeed in Part I of 
Behemoth, or the epitome of the civil wars of England, 
Hobbes explicitly rejects the idea: “… the people in 
general were so ignorant of their duty, as that not one 
perhaps of ten thousand knew what right any man had 
to command him, or what necessity there was of King or 
Commonwealth, for which he was to part with his money 
against his will; but thought himself to be so much master 
of whatsoever he possessed, that it could not be taken 
from him upon any pretence of common safety without 
his own consent” (Hobbes, 1839). Still the concept of 
a “Hobbesian Minimal State” is conforming to Hobbes 
ideas about the origin and purposes of civil society and 
in this sense it is applied in this paper. That is the sense 
in which Levin uses the concept of “Hobbesian Minimal 
State” and also, in my understanding, equivalent to the 
identification James Buchanan has with a “Hobbesian” 
world view, one in which individuals are utility 
maximizers, everyone prefers order to anarchy, only the 
sovereign can establish order, but there are no controls 
over the sovereign’s passions. For Buchanan, that view 
is compatible with Public Choice theory, although it was 
empirically disproved; after all, history tells us that almost 
always the sovereigns have been constrained (Buchanan, 
1979, p. 274). So, here the “Hobbesian” view, as for the 
“Virginia school”, should be blended with contractualism 
(Buchanan, 2000, p. 7) and should not be understood 
as literally and narrowly derived from Hobbes thought. 
“To the extent that the fiscal 
proviso on the absoluteness 
of  private property rights 
with allowance for government 
intervention in money and 
banking is an argument 
of  political realism, it does 
not carry moral weight, the 
sovereign may take what is 
necessary for the survival of  
his regime simply because he 
can without regard to what he 
or others know to be right. ”
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purposes22, similar to the one advocated under 
the natural law-individual rights tradition. 
That is, at least, the exception Professor Buchanan 
takes with Thomas Hobbes, who “failed to see 
that resolution of the problem raised by the 
presumed anarchistic chaos does not require the 
all-powerful sovereign, and that such resolution 
requires, instead, only the limited sovereign which 
enforces property and contract” (Buchanan, 
2005, p. 66).
To the extent that the fiscal proviso on the 
absoluteness of private property rights with 
allowance for government intervention in money 
and banking is an argument of political realism, 
it does not carry moral weight, the sovereign may 
take what is necessary for the survival of his regime 
simply because he can without regard to what he 
or others know to be right. The recognition that 
that is a fact of life, that persons in a position of 
power may abuse of their position for personal 
benefit knowing that is not fair, is an important part 
of the description of the reality we are discussing 
in this paper and therefore it needs to be taken 
into account, but it is not part of the normative 
discussion conduced in this paper23.
To the extent that the fiscal proviso is an ethical 
argument, it may be considered in two ways; 
first, it may be considered in a very narrow form, 
and in this case only differing from a conception 
of absolute private property in the sense that it 
would allow, in emergencies, the use of property 
to be compensated for later on; and in the second 
form, it may simply be equated with the bleak and 
cynical moral position argued by Thrasymachus in 
the dialogue depicted in the first book of Plato’s 
The Republic.
The argument for the morality of the very narrow 
limits in which the fiscal necessities of the State 
may justify a temporary and further compensated 
mitigation of private property rights may be found 
in the authority of Juan de Mariana when he wrote, 
“In case of urgent need the king might also debase 
the coinage without the explicit consent of the 
people but would be under obligation to restore 
the old coinage as soon as normal conditions 
returned and to make good any loss sustained by 
those concerned” (Laures, 2008, p. 126).
As it is well known, Juan de Mariana argued 
that debasing the currency is equivalent to a 
tax and, therefore, subject to the consent of the 
subjects, and punishable with excommunication, 
as prescribed by the Bull In Coena Domini at least 
since 1478 when such an article was introduced 
by Pope Martino V and was amended several 
times until the 1587 version of Pope Sixto V in 
force at the time of “De Monetae Mutatione” 
(López, 1768, p. 17)24. Still, the exception of 
emergency, if duly compensated, is considered 
morally acceptable by Mariana25.
22 For all practical purposes, because it must be assumed that under the Hobbesian covenant, the sovereign will utilize every 
means at his disposal to restore or compensate any property taken in an emergency to the defense of the polity.
23 Still, evidently, there is a qualitative distinction, both legal and moral, between taxation and expropriation and that will soon 
be explored. 
24 As common an opinion of the sixteenth-century theologians as the censure of excommunication in the case of a king imposing 
new taxes without the consent of the people would be (Laures, 2008, p. 125), that was not necessarily the opinion of the kings 
in Europe and Spain in particular, more inclined to see the Bull as an intromission into secular affairs, as the publication of 
Don Juan Luis López’ Historia Legal de la Bula llamada “In Coena Domini” and the legal opinion of Josef de Ledesma show. 
25 In regard to national defense, an interesting feature to explore is to what extent the very provision of defense is the compensation 
for any takings made to fund it. Here the context of the “Hobbesian” social contract mentioned earlier should be brought back 
to the discussion. It would be unfair for the sovereign to take a given piece of property because it happens to be at hand and 
put the burden of its loss on the shoulders of its previous owner alone instead of distributing that burden among all the citizenry 
in the constitutionally agreed form. That is what differentiates taxation from expropriation.
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As a matter of fact, it seems clear that one cannot 
expect from any government respect for private 
property rights and freedom of contract in general 
and sound money and free banking in particular, 
in the presence of armed conflict. This attitude 
of disregard for individual property rights is the 
“natural” response of different governments in 
different historical moments. It is a “fact of life.” 
The acceptance of this attitude as the “natural” 
response from government in facing military 
struggle does not imply, in any way, that the survival 
of the polity justifies unconditionally incursions 
against private property rights in general and 
sound money and free banking in particular.
A discussion on alternative ways to finance war 
other than debasing the currency and regimenting 
the banking system to drain the savings of the 
country in the shortest period of time possible, if 
one has sufficient detachment, is a valid intellectual 
exercise on contra-factual arguments. But in this 
paper we are dealing with those arguments of 
forçamaior that in face of the circumstances were 
the basis for actual decisions. 
It is reasonable to acknowledge the fact that it is 
in the “depth” of financial markets (as the concept 
has been utilizedmore recently), i.e., in the 
complexity and extension of capital markets that 
a country may find the appropriate instruments 
for financing emergencies, and the “deepness” 
of a financial market is a direct function of the 
extension of the protection of private property 
rights and freedom of contract in that society. On 
the other hand, desperate times require desperate 
measures, and it is not always that the political 
leaders are at leisure to think in any time frame 
other than the shortest possible.
To distinguish between moments like, say, at 
the beginning of the American Revolutionary 
War, a moment in which the situation could not 
seem more desperate, and the circumstances of 
American federal finances during WWI, in which 
no “greenbacks” were issued because it was not 
deemed to be necessary, would be an exercise 
in casuistry, and the result of such exercise 
would likely be that sometimes the interest of 
the community may be understood as a morally 
superior value to individual rights by the majority 
of the population, or by the political leaders, or 
the intellectual elite, or whomever. To engage this 
utilitarian reasoning as an acceptable guide for 
moral evaluation is exactly the point about the 
pervasiveness of a “fiscal proviso” as a matter 
of real-politik.
So, the different episodes in American history 
in which the federal government has intervened 
with money and banking in order to provide for 
war finance allow one, from the comfort of one’s 
armchair, to distinguish two different arguments 
against governments trumping private property 
rights in cases of emergencies: the first one is that 
it is not an efficient way to gather the recourses 
necessary to face the emergencies, and the 
second is that it is not in the best interest of the 
community to do that in the long run26.
7.  CONCLUDING NOTES 
26 Other episodes of relativization of private property rights in the face of a perceived emergency are the Gold Clause Cases in the 
1930s. When Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 devalued the U.S. Dollar from about 22 dollars per ounce to 35 dollars per ounce, 
a Joint Resolution of Congress invalidated all contracts establishing payments at the pre-devaluation parity. That was challenged 
in court and, in Perry v. United States (Perry, 294 U.S. 330, 1935) as in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137, 1803) before that, the 
decision denied a remedy to the claimants in order to avoid a confrontation with the President. Franklin Roosevelt made clear to 
the Justices that out of necessity, he would not obey a decision upholding the Gold Clauses, forcing them to risk a constitutional 
crisis. But, as stated by Professor Gerard N. Magliocca in an undated working paper (Magliocca, p. 32), “The most plausible 
source of that necessary duty is the Commander in Chief Clause, but even the most eager apologist for executive power could 
not stretch that provision to cover monetary action in peacetime.” That basically draws the line between what was an emergency 
in which case qualified action would be morally acceptable, and what, in essence, was a pure exercise of power.
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The first argument can be easily granted, i.e. it is 
not so difficult to show how, through the protection 
of private property, the government may create 
the trust necessary to raise more resources than 
through rapacious means. That is an argument 
that, without denying the moral case for trumping 
private property rights, gives practical reasons for 
limiting it to the circumstances of the most extreme 
and desperate emergencies.
The second argument is more difficult to defend, 
i.e. what if there is really no time to gather the 
resources necessary to face the emergency by 
any means other than confiscation? Does any 
individual have the right to refuse his property 
when the very survival of the community as an 
independent political body is at risk and with that 
his own life and the remaining of his property? 
The answer to this question is far from consensual 
in America and, in any event, historically, the 
government in the U.S. has not refrained from 
trumping private property rights in case of 
emergencies out of respect for individual rights. 
The way I see it, the recognition that even American 
political institutions will allow the relativization of 
individual rights in case of emergencies is the 
main lesson left by the history of war financing in 
the United States. A major challenge that remains 
unmet is to show all involved parties that it is 
possible to create a principled way to deal with 
such cases. 
The current monetary constitutions in the U.S., in 
Europe, and everywhere are not the ideal monetary 
arrangements for a free society. Nonetheless, 
they command enormous legitimacy. They are 
not yet part of the commonly accepted discourse 
claims for the abolition of the forced course of 
the currency and the closing of the central bank, 
and the different national financial systems are 
part of the economic backbone that sustains the 
current level of division of labor and subsequent 
production without which the life of billions would 
be compromised. 
The de facto precedence that fiscal considerations 
have taken over monetary matters since men in 
“So, the different episodes in 
American history in which 
the federal government has 
intervened with money and 
banking in order to provide 
for war finance allow one, 
from the comfort of  one’s 
armchair, to distinguish two 
different arguments against 
governments trumping 
private property rights in 
cases of  emergencies: the 
first one is that it is not an 
efficient way to gather the 
recourses necessary to face the 
emergencies, and the second 
is that it is not in the best 
interest of  the community to 
do that in the long run.”
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power first grasped the potential to use money 
manipulation as an instrument to readily dispose 
of the existing goods and services in society must 
be understood as what it is, that is, an exercise 
of brute force, an act of extortion on the part of 
ones who have the necessary means of coercion.
The only qualification to such indictment is 
the old one, present already in Oresme and 
Juan de Mariana, that if the very security of 
the individuals is at risk, it is excusable for the 
government to use the liquid wealth of the same 
individuals for their defense to the same extent 
that it uses any other form of wealth, and once 
the emergency ceases, the private property 
taken from some or all of the citizens should 
be restored or adequate compensation must be 
paid. Again, it is stated that there are aspects of 
the reality, economic considerations that make 
inevitable the mobilization of liquid assets by 
men in power in the case of war. It is through the 
use of liquid assets that they may have access 
to dispose of the available goods in amounts 
well above the current yield of all capital goods 
in society without forcing their liquidation, 
which, incidentally, would be very damaging to 
production, as Mises pointed out.
That is, inclusively, what makes the organization 
of political societies in the form of national States 
the prevalent form of political organization in 
our days.And such assertion can be derived 
from the fact that national States are in a better 
condition to readily dispose of not only current 
production, but also accumulated wealth in 
society by manipulation of money and banking 
rules. In sum, the political organization of human 
societies in national States with the power to 
manipulate money and banking has proved 
to be a more efficient arrangement to readily 
provide for the sinews of war than other forms of 
political organization. 
It is on this consideration of real-politik that I 
see with immense skepticism any idea of getting 
away from the national State or its presence in 
monetary matters.
“It is also our contention, 
restated with this paper, 
that although it is not 
possible to eliminate the fiscal 
proviso that de facto entitles 
the sovereign to intervene 
in money and banking 
arrangements, it is possible 
to limit the moral support 
to these interventions to the 
needs of  war financing, and 
no State monopoly of  money, 
central bank, laws of  legal 
tender, or authorization for 
peacetime public financing are 
necessary for that.”
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But as Ayn Rand wrote, you do not define what is 
morally right in normal conditions in society from 
the perspective of survivors from a sunken ship 
clinging to a raft (Rand, 1964, p. 56)27.
Even recognizing that the most adequate 
monetary institutions are the ones most suitable 
for its essential function; if it is understood that the 
survival of the political community is a good in 
itself28 that may, in case of an emergency, justify the 
use of accumulated resources of the individuals 
in such community for its defense, then a fiscal 
proviso may be made in the regulations of money 
and banking in order to allow the sovereign to 
draw on the depth of the financial markets for the 
resources necessary to wage war. But even that 
should be done, to the greatest extent possible, 
without eliminating the attributes of money 
that make it appropriate for its main function; 
otherwise, there will be no deep financial markets 
to draw from.
One of the key conclusions of my research on 
money is that the ideal attributes for a monetary 
system would be the production of money 
stable in value, with a supply flexible enough to 
accommodate changes in the demand for cash 
balances, inexpensive for the economic agents, 
and which would prevent the production of 
inflationary credit expansion, that is, would be 
able to prevent the counterpart in the financial 
sector of a mismatch in time and quantity between 
savings and investments in the real sector.
It is also our contention, restated with this paper, 
that although it is not possible to eliminate the 
fiscal proviso that de facto entitles the sovereign 
to intervene in money and banking arrangements, 
it is possible to limit the moral support to these 
interventions to the needs of war financing, and 
no State monopoly of money, central bank, laws 
of legal tender, or authorization for peacetime 
public financing are necessary for that. Actually, to 
the extent that they introduce attributes, which are 
inimical to the ones best suited to money’s natural 
function by the introduction of instability of the 
money supply, into the monetary arrangements, 
they compromise the possibilities of floating war 
bonds in case of need. 
If a central bank is understood as a modern proxy 
to the monetary prerogatives of government 
in general, only to be used in cases of extreme 
emergencies, then a moral defense for its existence 
may be found in this paper. However, if the central 
bank is understood just as one instrument to 
manage fiat money for any other purpose than 
the defense of the life and property of individuals, 
this paper advocates that it is morally wrong, 
tantamount to forgery, economically unnecessary 
and also damaging to the purposes of individual 
human flourishing that are the ultimate rationale 
for political institutions.
27 According to her, “It is important to differentiate between the rules of conduct in an emergency situation and the rules of 
conduct in the normal conditions of human existence. This does not mean a double standard of morality: the standard and 
the basic principles remain the same, but their application to either case requires precise definitions” (1964, p. 54).
28 Since each individual may choose to vote with his feet and leave a given polity with his family and his property if he judges that 
the cost in terms of blood and treasure to defend it as an independent political entity is not worthwhile, it is perfectly possible 
for a polity to realize that a commitment for its defense would likely be a suicidal pact and surrender its independence instead. 
Furthermore, such individual right to leave, in my understanding, can be exercised at any time, well into the conflagration.
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